This paper studies the effects of cooperation in a hub-and-spoke network with high-speed rail and airline competition. The distinctive elements of our analysis are the consideration of: (i) per-passenger airport and rail infrastructure fees; (ii) mixed bundling pricing by partners, and (iii) an airline duopoly in the international market. We show that partners fix the cheapest bundle price of the combined trip, that non-allied operators respond by decreasing the prices per link, and that connecting traffic increases. Per-passenger fees significantly affect the price differences following cooperation. An empirical application confirms that it is privately profitable and that welfare gains are in the range of 0.8–2.2%; these can be higher for lower fees or lower cross-price elasticity between modes.

本文研究了在具有高铁和航空公司竞争的轮辐式网络中合作的效果。我们分析的独特之处在于考虑：（i）每位乘客的机场和铁路基础设施费用；（ii）合作伙伴的混合捆绑定价，以及（iii）国际市场上的航空公司双头垄断。我们表明，合作伙伴确定了组合旅行中最便宜的捆绑价格，非联盟运营商通过降低每个链接的价格做出响应，并且连接流量增加了。每位乘客的费用会大大影响合作后的价格差异。一项经验应用证实，它是私人盈利的，福利收益在0.8％至2.2％的范围内。对于较低的费用或较低的模式间交叉价格弹性，这些价格可能更高。