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Co-Tier Uplink Power Control in Small Cell Networks by Stackelberg Game with Two-Way Pricing Mechanism
Mobile Networks and Applications ( IF 3.8 ) Pub Date : 2020-08-07 , DOI: 10.1007/s11036-020-01619-y
Chih-Cheng Tseng , Hwang-Cheng Wang , Kuo-Chang Ting , Shih-Han Lo , Fang-Chang Kuo

Due to the continuous evolving of mobile communication technologies, deploying small cells (SCs), also known as SC base stations (SBSs), is regarded as one of the feasible alternatives to provide better indoor signal quality to meet the ever-increasing demand for mobile broadband data in indoor environments. However, the co-tier uplink interference, i.e., interference between SBSs, increases when SBSs are densely deployed. Consequently, the sum-capacity of the small cell network (SCN) is deteriorated. To manage such interference, a co-tier uplink power control scheme which combines the Stackelberg game with two-way pricing mechanism is proposed. In this scheme, among the SBSs, one is selected as the leader and the rest are the followers. Under the premise of not violating the maximum tolerable uplink co-tier interference constraint, leader UE and follower UEs achieve the compromised uplink transmit power based on the proposed two-way bargaining procedure. The average sum-capacity of the SCN and the average uplink transmit power of leader UE and follower UEs are used as the major metrics to evaluate the performance of the proposed scheme. Compared with the simulation results obtained by only controlling the transmit power of follower UEs, i.e., Stackelberg game with one-way pricing, the proposed co-tier uplink power control scheme, i.e., Stackelberg game with two-way pricing, attains higher sum-capacity with smaller transmit power.



中文翻译:

带有双向定价机制的Stackelberg博弈在小型蜂窝网络中的协同上行链路功率控制

由于移动通信技术的不断发展,部署小型小区(SC)(也称为SC基站(SBS))被视为提供更好的室内信号质量以满足不断增长的移动需求的可行替代方案之一。室内环境中的宽带数据。然而,当密集部署SBS时,co-tier上行链路干扰(即,SBS之间的干扰)增加。因此,小型小区网络(SCN)的总容量恶化。为了管理这种干扰,提出了一种将Stackelberg游戏与双向定价机制相结合的分层上行链路功率控制方案。在此方案中,在SBS中,选择一个作为领导者,其余作为跟随者。在不违反最大可容忍上行共层干扰约束的前提下,领导者UE和跟随者UE基于所提议的双向协商过程来实现受损的上行链路发射功率。SCN的平均总容量以及引导者UE和跟随者UE的平均上行链路发射功率被用作评估所提出方案性能的主要指标。与仅通过控制跟随者UE的发射功率(即采用单向定价的Stackelberg游戏获得的仿真结果)相比,所提出的分层共线上行链路功率控制方案(即采用双向定价的Stackelberg游戏)可获得更高的总和。发射功率较小的容量。SCN的平均总容量以及引导者UE和跟随者UE的平均上行链路发射功率被用作评估所提出方案性能的主要指标。与仅通过控制跟随者UE的发射功率(即采用单向定价的Stackelberg游戏获得的仿真结果)相比,所提出的分层共线上行链路功率控制方案(即采用双向定价的Stackelberg游戏)可获得更高的总和。发射功率较小的容量。SCN的平均总容量以及引导者UE和跟随者UE的平均上行链路发射功率被用作评估所提出方案性能的主要指标。与仅通过控制跟随者UE的发射功率(即采用单向定价的Stackelberg游戏获得的仿真结果)相比,所提出的分层共线上行链路功率控制方案(即采用双向定价的Stackelberg游戏)可获得更高的总和。发射功率较小的容量。

更新日期:2020-08-08
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