当前位置:
X-MOL 学术
›
Math. Probl. Eng.
›
论文详情
Our official English website, www.x-mol.net, welcomes your feedback! (Note: you will need to create a separate account there.)
Game Theoretic Analysis of After-Sales Service in Two-Echelon Supply Chain with Warranty Sensitive Demand
Mathematical Problems in Engineering ( IF 1.430 ) Pub Date : 2020-08-04 , DOI: 10.1155/2020/2317246 Yuqing Qi 1 , Jing Wu 1 , Tiandongjie Zhao 1 , Yuling Sun 1 , Bin Wu 1
Mathematical Problems in Engineering ( IF 1.430 ) Pub Date : 2020-08-04 , DOI: 10.1155/2020/2317246 Yuqing Qi 1 , Jing Wu 1 , Tiandongjie Zhao 1 , Yuling Sun 1 , Bin Wu 1
Affiliation
After-sales service contract is widely popular in business. Although both the cases of manufacturer offering warranty and retailer offering warranty are common in market, the differences between them have been few studied. In this paper, we build a two-echelon supply chain in which a manufacturer produces limit quality products and sells them to a retailer. To promote sales, the manufacturer or retailer offers a free-replacement warranty to the customers. Customer’s demand is affected by the warranty length. We investigate the game relationships between the supply chain members. We find that the warranty length negatively relates to the product quality in both the manufacturer offering warranty case and the retailer offering warranty case. When retailer’s profit margin is not low, the retailer offers a longer warranty than the manufacturer and vice versa. Profit of the supply chain is also analyzed along with a numerical study.
中文翻译:
保修敏感需求的二级供应链售后服务的博弈分析
售后服务合同在业务中广受欢迎。尽管制造商提供保修的情况和零售商提供保修的情况在市场上都很普遍,但是它们之间的差异很少被研究。在本文中,我们建立了一个两级供应链,其中制造商生产极限质量的产品并将其出售给零售商。为了促进销售,制造商或零售商向客户提供免费更换保修。客户的需求受保修期限的影响。我们调查供应链成员之间的博弈关系。我们发现,在制造商提供保修的情况下和零售商提供保修的情况下,保修期限都与产品质量负相关。当零售商的利润率不低时,零售商比制造商提供更长的保修,反之亦然。还将对供应链的利润进行数值分析。
更新日期:2020-08-04
中文翻译:
保修敏感需求的二级供应链售后服务的博弈分析
售后服务合同在业务中广受欢迎。尽管制造商提供保修的情况和零售商提供保修的情况在市场上都很普遍,但是它们之间的差异很少被研究。在本文中,我们建立了一个两级供应链,其中制造商生产极限质量的产品并将其出售给零售商。为了促进销售,制造商或零售商向客户提供免费更换保修。客户的需求受保修期限的影响。我们调查供应链成员之间的博弈关系。我们发现,在制造商提供保修的情况下和零售商提供保修的情况下,保修期限都与产品质量负相关。当零售商的利润率不低时,零售商比制造商提供更长的保修,反之亦然。还将对供应链的利润进行数值分析。