This paper delivers an electricity supply chain coordination framework through the newsvendor model to provide an optimal contract design with the aim of maximizing profits. Given retailers' attitude towards the risk associated with the demand uncertainty, the framework optimally considers overage and underage costs, and discount policy to define the contract share and prices. A novel simulation-optimization approach has also been proposed to provide a global optimal solution for the model using the advantages of the linear transportation model. More analytically, the approach leads to some original and meaningful trade-offs among retailers’ and generation companies’ profits, markets share, overage and underage costs, and the all-unit discount given by retailers. By this means, an almost linear, positive relationship is found between the spot market share and the underage cost. On the contrary, retailers' sensitivity to overage cost is greater if the share of the spot market is low and the retailer is more risk-averse. In this way, the greater the overage cost, the higher the share of the spot market. And, the lower the overage and underage costs, the greater the retailers profit, and the lower the generation companies’ profit due to the lower retailers’ order quantity. The amount of the discount has a negligible effect on retailers’ order quantity, while lowering prices. However, an increase in the amount of the discount has a negligible but negative effect on the spot market share.

本文通过新闻供应商模型提供了一个电力供应链协调框架，以提供最佳合同设计，以实现利润最大化。考虑到零售商对与需求不确定性相关的风险的态度，该框架可以最佳地考虑超额和不足成本以及折扣政策以定义合同份额和价格。还提出了一种新颖的模拟优化方法，以利用线性运输模型的优势为模型提供全局最优解。更具分析性地，这种方法导致零售商和发电公司的利润，市场份额，超额和不足成本以及零售商给予的所有单位折扣之间的一些原始而有意义的折衷。通过这种方式，几乎是线性的 现货市场份额与未成年人成本之间存在正相关关系。相反，如果现货市场的份额较低并且零售商更愿意规避风险，那么零售商对超额成本的敏感性就会更高。这样，超额费用越大，现货市场的份额就越高。而且，由于零售商的订货量越少，超额和不足的成本越低，零售商的利润就越大，而发电公司的利润就越低。折扣金额对零售商的订购量影响很小，同时降低了价格。但是，折价幅度的增加对现货市场份额的影响可忽略不计，但具有负面影响。如果现货市场的份额较低并且零售商更愿意规避风险，则对超额成本的敏感性更高。这样，超额费用越大，现货市场的份额就越高。而且，由于零售商的订货量越少，超额和不足的成本越低，零售商的利润就越大，而发电公司的利润就越低。折扣金额对零售商的订购量影响很小，同时降低了价格。但是，折价幅度的增加对现货市场份额的影响可忽略不计，但具有负面影响。如果现货市场的份额较低并且零售商更愿意规避风险，则对超额成本的敏感性更高。这样，超额费用越大，现货市场的份额就越高。而且，由于零售商的订货量越少，超额和不足的成本越低，零售商的利润就越大，而发电公司的利润就越低。折扣金额对零售商的订购量影响很小，同时降低了价格。但是，折价幅度的增加对现货市场份额的影响可忽略不计，但具有负面影响。零售商订购量越少，发电公司的利润越低。折扣金额对零售商的订购量影响很小，同时降低了价格。但是，折价幅度的增加对现货市场份额的影响可忽略不计，但具有负面影响。零售商订购量越少，发电公司的利润越低。折扣金额对零售商的订购量影响很小，同时降低了价格。但是，折价幅度的增加对现货市场份额的影响可忽略不计，但具有负面影响。