This paper builds an agent-based model to study the impact of analyst competition on analyst optimism. Two strategies (a catering strategy and a pressure strategy) are used to model analysts conflicts of interest between listed corporations and institutional clients. The finding suggests that the relationship between competition and analyst optimism is nonlinear. Low-level competition generates more analyst unbiased forecasts. However, the condition of no competition or high-level competition generates more analyst optimistic forecasts. The empirical test also confirms that analysts issue less biased earnings forecasts under the condition of low-level competition.

本文建立了一个基于代理的模型来研究分析师竞争对分析师乐观的影响。两种策略（餐饮策略和压力策略）用于对上市公司和机构客户之间的分析师利益冲突进行建模。该发现表明竞争与分析师乐观之间的关系是非线性的。低水平竞争会产生更多分析师无偏见的预测。但是，没有竞争或高层竞争的条件会产生更多的分析师乐观预测。经验检验还证实，在低水平竞争的情况下，分析师发布的收益预测偏差较小。