Practical and anecdotal evidence indicates that the drop-shipping policy has been extensively adopted in electronic commerce (E-commerce) practice. However, how the different structures of dual channels affect the drop-shipping strategy of a retailer and supply chain efficiency has not been adequately investigated. To fill this research gap, this study performs a game-theoretic analysis of the drop-shipping strategy of a retailer under two practical dual-channel supply chain structures, namely, manufacturer-owned and retailer-owned online channel structures (MOS and ROS). Under each structure, the optimal pricing and the variations in profits are analytically presented with reselling or drop shipping in the corresponding channel. We show that under MOS, drop shipping can lower both wholesale and retail prices. By contrast, under ROS, drop shipping can decrease the offline retail price and the wholesale price but lower the online retail price only when the ratio of the unit fulfillment fee to overstock inventory is relatively low. The retailer prefers to adopt the drop-shipping policy under both MOS and ROS. Counterintuitively, the profits of both retailer and manufacturer are independent of the unit order fulfillment fee under MOS; however, under ROS, the profit of the manufacturer indicates a decreasing trend, whereas that of the retailer continuously increases with the unit order fulfillment fee. In terms of the performance of the entire supply chain, ROS dominates MOS when the proportion of brick-and-mortar (BM) shoppers is sufficiently high. In specific, beyond a certain service level, drop shipping in the retailer-owned online channel is preferred; otherwise, reselling in such channel is dominant. When the proportion of BM shoppers is moderate, MOS with drop shipping in the BM channel is the best choice for the entire supply chain. When the proportion of BM shoppers is low, MOS with reselling in the BM channel becomes the dominant option.

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转售或直接运输：电子商务双渠道结构的战略分析

实际和轶事证据表明，在电子商务（E-commerce）实践中已广泛采用了托运政策。但是，尚未充分研究双通道的不同结构如何影响零售商的托运策略和供应链效率。为了填补这一研究空白，本研究对制造商拥有和零售商拥有的在线渠道结构（MOS和ROS）两个实用的双渠道供应链结构下零售商的直销策略进行了博弈论分析。 。在每种结构下，将通过相应渠道中的转售或直接运送来分析性地显示最佳定价和利润变化。我们表明，在MOS下，直接运输可以降低批发和零售价格。相比之下，在ROS下，直接运输可以降低线下零售价和批发价，但仅当单位履行费与积压库存的比率相对较低时才降低在线零售价。零售商更喜欢在MOS和ROS下采用直接发货政策。违反直觉的是，零售商和制造商的利润都与MOS下的单位订单履行费用无关；但是，在ROS的情况下，制造商的利润表明下降的趋势，而零售商的利润则随着单位订单履行费用的增加而持续增长。就整个供应链的绩效而言，当实体店（BM）购物者的比例足够高时，ROS将主导MOS。具体来说，除了一定的服务水平外，最好使用零售商拥有的在线渠道进行直接运送；除此以外，在这种渠道中进行转售占主导地位。当BM购物者的比例适中时，BM渠道中运送下降的MOS是整个供应链的最佳选择。当BM购物者的比例较低时，在BM通道中转售的MOS将成为主要选择。