This paper studies a stochastic differential game of transboundary pollution abatement between two kinds of ecological compensation and the abatement policy, in which the learning by doing is taken into account. Emission and pollution abatement between upstream and downstream region in the same basin is a Stackelberg game, and the downstream regions provide economic compensation for pollution abatement in the upstream region. We discuss the feedback Nash equilibrium strategies of proportional compensation and investment compensation, and it is found that an appropriate ecological compensation ratio can improve the investment level of pollution abatement in the two regions by accumulating experience in the process of learning by doing. In the long term, the investment compensation mechanism is an effective transboundary pollution abatement measure that can continuously reduce the water pollution stock in the upstream and downstream.

中文翻译：

---

“边做边学”边际减排生态补偿标准差异博弈

研究了两种生态补偿与减排政策之间跨界污染减排的随机差分博弈，其中考虑了边做边学。同一流域上游和下游地区之间的排放和污染减排是一个Stackelberg博弈，下游地区为上游地区的污染减排提供经济补偿。我们讨论了比例补偿和投资补偿的纳什均衡反馈策略，发现适当的生态补偿比可以通过在实践中积累经验来提高两个地区的污染减排投资水平。在长期，