Government plays a vital role in improving community resilience against natural disasters. Due to the limited relief capacity of a government, it is desirable to develop a risk-sharing mechanism involving both private sector providers (e.g., insurers, for-profit disaster agencies, and firms that provide resources for risk mitigation and recovery) and the public. In this article, we take catastrophe insurance as an example to examine ways of providing incentives for multilateral risk sharing, especially when it involves socially connected communities. We consider a sequential game with three sets of players, the government, a private insurer, and a community of households. The government determines an optimal subsidy portfolio (including ex ante insurance premium subsidy and ex post relief subsidy) for a community with particular levels of social network influence and risk perception. We characterize the equilibrium purchase rate within the community by positive and negative herding behaviors and identify the government’s optimal subsidy strategy dependent on the available budget and the emphasis on ex post social responsibility. We also extend the game to account for multi-community coverage and multi-year insurance contracts to demonstrate the benefits of spatial and inter-temporal risk pooling.

政府在提高社区抵御自然灾害的能力方面发挥着至关重要的作用。由于政府的救济能力有限，因此需要建立一种风险分担机制，让私营部门提供者（例如，保险公司，营利性灾难机构以及提供风险缓解和恢复资源的公司）参与其中。在本文中，我们以巨灾保险为例，研究了为多边风险分担提供激励措施的方法，特别是在涉及社会联系社区的情况下。我们考虑一个由三组参与者（政府，一家私人保险公司和一个家庭社区）组成的连续博弈。政府确定最佳的补贴组合（包括事前保险费补贴和事后救济补贴），用于具有特定水平的社交网络影响力和风险感知的社区。我们通过正面和负面的羊群行为来描述社区内的均衡购买率，并根据可用预算和对事后社会责任的重视，确定政府的最佳补贴策略。我们还将游戏扩展到考虑到多社区保险和多年保险合同，以证明空间风险和跨时间风险池的好处。