This study examines how a new billing process of the Thai Civil Servant Medical Benefit Scheme affects outpatient care utilization. Unlike policy changes considered in most existing studies, there is no change in cost‐sharing for the scheme considered here. Previously, the beneficiaries had to pay out of pocket and receive their reimbursement later. The new billing system allows hospitals to charge the government directly. Using patient‐level data from a large hospital, we find that the change affects outpatient utilization through both visiting rates and treatment intensity. These positive impacts are moderate, but persistent. The estimates are not sensitive to our choice of a time window, but their magnitudes can be sensitive to model specifications. Our analysis also suggests that patients with lower utilization rates (conditional on illnesses) prior to the change in the billing process increase their healthcare utilization more proportionally.

中文翻译：

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计费系统对医疗保健利用的影响：泰国公务员医疗福利计划的证据

这项研究探讨了泰国公务员医疗福利计划的新计费流程如何影响门诊护理利用。与大多数现有研究中考虑的政策变化不同，此处考虑的计划的分摊费用没有变化。以前，受益人必须自掏腰包，稍后再获得报销。新的计费系统使医院可以直接向政府收费。使用大型医院的患者水平数据，我们发现这种变化会通过就诊率和治疗强度影响门诊患者的利用率。这些积极影响是中度的，但持久的。估计值对我们选择的时间窗口不敏感，但其大小可能对模型规格敏感。