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‘Like thermodynamics before Boltzmann.’ On the emergence of Einstein's distinction between constructive and principle theories
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics ( IF 1.663 ) Pub Date : 2020-06-10 , DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsb.2020.02.005
Marco Giovanelli

In a 1919 article for the Times of London, Einstein declared the relativity theory to be a ‘principle theory’, like thermodynamics, rather than a ‘constructive theory’, like the kinetic theory of gases. The present paper attempts to trace back the prehistory of this famous distinction. It provides a systematic overview of Einstein's repeated use of the relativity theory/thermodynamics analysis after 1905 and inserts it into its historical settings, the early reception of relativity against the background of fin de siècle electron theories. Einstein initially used the relativity theory/thermodynamics comparison to address a specific objection. In his 1905 relativity paper he had determined the velocity-dependence of the electron's mass by adapting Newton's particle dynamics to the relativity principle. However, according to many, this result was not admissible without making some assumption about the structure of the electron. Einstein replied that the relativity theory is similar to thermodynamics. Unlike the usual physical theories, it does not directly try to construct models of specific physical systems; it provides empirically motivated and mathematically formulated criteria for the acceptability of such theories. New theories can be obtained by modifying existing theories valid in limiting case so that they comply with such criteria. Einstein progressively transformed this line of the defense into a positive heuristics. Instead of directly searching for new theories, it is often more effective to search for conditions that constraint the number of possible theories. The constructive/principle theories opposition should be considered not only as abstract classification of theories, but also as Einstein's attempt to formulate a sort of ‘logic of discovery’. The paper argues that most of Einstein's scientific successes were obtained by following the principle strategy. Most of his failures happened when he was forced to fall back to the constructive strategy.



中文翻译:

“像玻尔兹曼之前的热力学。” 爱因斯坦关于建构主义和原理理论的区分的出现

爱因斯坦在1919年为伦敦时报》撰写的一篇文章中宣称,相对论是像热力学一样的“原理论”,而不是像气体动力学一样的“构造论”。本文试图追溯这一著名区别的历史。它提供了爱因斯坦在1905年后重复使用相对论/热力学分析的系统概述,并将其插入到其历史背景中,即在fin desiècle背景下对相对论的早期接受电子理论。爱因斯坦最初使用相对论/热力学比较来解决一个特定的反对意见。在他的1905年的相对论论文中,他通过使牛顿的粒子动力学适应相对论原理,确定了电子质量的速度依赖性。但是,根据许多人的说法,如果不对电子结构做一些假设,就不能接受该结果。爱因斯坦回答说,相对论与热力学相似。与通常的物理理论不同,它不直接尝试构建特定物理系统的模型;它为此类理论的可接受性提供了基于经验的动机和数学公式化的标准。新的理论可以通过修改在有限情况下有效的现有理论来获得,从而使其符合此类标准。爱因斯坦逐渐将这道防线转变为一种积极的启发式方法。代替直接搜索新的理论,搜索限制可能的理论数量的条件通常更有效。建构主义/原理理论的对立不仅应被视为理论的抽象分类,而且还应被视为爱因斯坦试图提出一种“发现逻辑”的尝试。该论文认为,爱因斯坦的大部分科学成就都是通过遵循原理性策略获得的。他的大多数失败都是在他被迫退回建设性战略时发生的。寻找限制可能理论数目的条件通常更为有效。建构主义/原理理论的对立不仅应被视为理论的抽象分类,而且还应被视为爱因斯坦试图提出一种“发现逻辑”的尝试。该论文认为,爱因斯坦的大部分科学成就都是通过遵循原理性策略获得的。他的大多数失败都是在他被迫退回建设性战略时发生的。寻找限制可能理论数目的条件通常更为有效。建构主义/原理理论的对立不仅应被视为理论的抽象分类,而且还应被视为爱因斯坦试图提出一种“发现逻辑”的尝试。该论文认为,爱因斯坦的大部分科学成就都是通过遵循原理性策略获得的。他的大多数失败都是在他被迫退回建设性战略时发生的。

更新日期:2020-06-10
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