Abstract This paper tracks increasingly aggressive initiatives by the United States government to reallocate spectrum on an expedited and unilateral basis well before conclusion of inter-governmental coordination. Rather than embrace the customary commitment to achieve consensus on global spectrum allocations at the International Telecommunication Union (“ITU”), the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) has auctioned off large blocks of frequencies for the next generation (“5G”) of wireless services. The FCC might have framed its first 5G auction, reassigning Ultra High Frequency (“UHF”) spectrum, as a one-time deviation from compliance with long standing, intergovernmental coordination procedures. These frequencies have ideal signal propagation characteristics and the Commission could use financial incentives—unavailable in most nations—to expedite “repacking” by incumbent broadcasters willing to move, share or abandon spectrum in exchange for ample financial compensation. However, the FCC has continued to auction off 5G spectrum on grounds that it must find ways to abate an acute shortage of wireless bandwidth and doing so will regain or maintain global leadership in wireless technologies. This paper offers a critical rebuke to unilateral spectrum management, because the short-term benefits expected by the U. S. government likely will be offset by countervailing harms to 5G manufacturers, carriers and consumers. The paper tracks fractious preparation for the ITU's 2019 World Radio Conference by the U.S. delegation and the mixed record achieved there. Additionally, the paper explains how injecting trade, industrial policy and national security issues at the ITU can trigger more delays and disputes, including possible retaliation by nations displeased with U.S. efforts to subvert traditional technology optimization goals. A worst case scenario has the ITU deadlocked and unable to reach closure on “mission critical” spectrum planning issues at World Radio Conferences, convened every four years. The paper concludes that costs and likely challenges to the efficacy and legitimacy of the ITU will reduce the benefits accruing from the FCC's unilateral, spectrum planning campaign.

中文翻译：

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美国单边频谱规划和政策中不断发展的 5G 案例研究

摘要 本文追踪了美国政府在政府间协调结束之前采取的越来越积极的举措，以加快和单方面地重新分配频谱。联邦通信委员会 (“FCC”) 并没有接受国际电信联盟 (“ITU”) 就全球频谱分配达成共识的习惯承诺，而是拍卖了用于下一代 (“5G”) 的大量频率。无线服务。FCC 可能已经制定了其第一次 5G 拍卖，重新分配超高频 (“UHF”) 频谱，作为对遵守长期存在的政府间协调程序的一次性偏离。这些频率具有理想的信号传播特性，委员会可以使用大多数国家不具备的经济激励措施来加快愿意移动、共享或放弃频谱的现有广播公司的“重新打包”，以换取充足的经济补偿。然而，FCC 继续拍卖 5G 频谱，理由是它必须找到解决无线带宽严重短缺的方法，这样做将重新获得或保持无线技术的全球领先地位。这篇论文对单边频谱管理提出了批评，因为美国政府预期的短期利益可能会被对 5G 制造商、运营商和消费者的损害抵消。这篇论文追踪了美国为 ITU 2019 年世界无线电大会所做的紧张筹备工作 代表团和在那里取得的混合记录。此外，该文件还解释了在国际电联注入贸易、产业政策和国家安全问题如何引发更多延误和争端，包括可能对美国颠覆传统技术优化目标的努力感到不满的国家进行报复。最坏的情况是国际电联陷入僵局，无法在每四年召开一次的世界无线电大会上解决“关键任务”频谱规划问题。该文件得出的结论是，对 ITU 的有效性和合法性的成本和可能面临的挑战将减少 FCC 单边频谱规划活动带来的好处。包括可能对美国颠覆传统技术优化目标的努力感到不满的国家进行报复。最坏的情况是国际电联陷入僵局，无法在每四年召开一次的世界无线电大会上解决“关键任务”频谱规划问题。该文件得出的结论是，对 ITU 的有效性和合法性的成本和可能面临的挑战将减少 FCC 单边频谱规划活动带来的好处。包括对美国颠覆传统技术优化目标的努力感到不满的国家可能进行的报复。最坏的情况是国际电联陷入僵局，无法在每四年召开一次的世界无线电大会上解决“关键任务”频谱规划问题。该文件得出的结论是，对 ITU 的有效性和合法性的成本和可能面临的挑战将减少 FCC 单边频谱规划活动带来的好处。