This paper develops a network model of interbank lending, in which banks decide to extend credit to their potential borrowers. Borrowers are subject to shocks that may force them to default on their loans. In contrast to much of the previous literature on financial networks, we focus on how anticipation of future defaults may result in ex ante “credit freezes,” whereby banks refuse to extend credit to one another. We first characterize the terms of the interbank contracts and the patterns of interbank lending that emerge in equilibrium. We then study how shifts in the distribution of shocks can result in complex credit freezes that travel throughout the network. We use this framework to analyze the effects of various policy interventions on systemic credit freezes.

本文建立了银行间同业拆借网络模型，其中银行决定将信贷扩展到其潜在借款人。借款人可能会遭受冲击，可能会迫使他们拖欠贷款。与以往有关金融网络的许多文献形成对比，我们关注的是对未来违约的预期可能导致事前的“信用冻结”，即银行拒绝相互授信。我们首先描述银行间合同的条款和均衡出现的银行间借贷模式。然后，我们研究冲击分布的变化如何导致遍及整个网络的复杂信用冻结。我们使用此框架来分析各种政策干预对系统性信用冻结的影响。