This study examines a two-echelon supply chain consisting of two competing manufacturers and one retailer that has the channel power, in which one manufacturer is engaged in sustainable technology to curb carbon emissions under the cap-and-trade regulation while the other one operates its business as usual in a traditional manner. Two different supply chain configurations concerning risk attributes of the agents are considered, that is, (ⅰ) two risk-neutral manufacturers with one risk-averse retailer; and (ⅱ) two risk-averse manufacturers with one risk-neutral retailer. Under the mean-variance framework, we use a retailer-leader game optimization approach to study operational decisions of these two systems. Specifically, optimal operational decisions of the agents are established in closed-form expressions and the corresponding profits and carbon emissions are assessed. Numerical experiments are conducted to analyze the impact of risk aversion of the underlying supply chains. The results show that each risk-averse agent would benefit from a low scale risk aversion. Further, low carbon emissions could be attainable if risk aversion scale of the underlying manufacturer is small or moderate. In addition, the carbon emissions might increase when risk aversion of the traditional manufacturer or the retailer is of small or moderate scale.

中文翻译：

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规避风险对具有碳减排约束的两级供应链系统的影响

这项研究考察了由两个相互竞争的制造商和一个具有渠道动力的零售商组成的两级供应链，其中一个制造商从事可持续技术，以抑制碳排放总量控制和贸易管制，而另一家则经营其碳排放权。以传统方式照常营业。考虑了关于代理商风险属性的两种不同的供应链配置，即（ⅰ）两家风险中立的制造商和一个规避风险的零售商；（ⅱ）两家规避风险的制造商和一家风险中立的零售商。在均值方差框架下，我们使用零售商-领导者博弈优化方法来研究这两个系统的运营决策。特别，代理商的最佳运营决策以封闭形式表达，并评估相应的利润和碳排放量。进行了数值实验，以分析潜在供应链风险规避的影响。结果表明，每种规避风险的人都会从低规模的规避风险中受益。此外，如果基础制造商的风险规避规模较小或适中，则可以实现低碳排放。此外，当传统制造商或零售商的风险规避规模较小或中等时，碳排放量可能会增加。如果基础制造商的风险规避规模较小或适中，则可以实现低碳排放。此外，当传统制造商或零售商的风险规避规模较小或中等时，碳排放量可能会增加。如果基础制造商的风险规避规模较小或适中，则可以实现低碳排放。此外，当传统制造商或零售商的风险规避规模较小或中等时，碳排放量可能会增加。