In order to analyze the game relationship of corporate social responsibility, this paper uses evolutionary game theory to construct the dynamic game of mixed strategy by using government supervision, enterprises and the public as the main body of the three-party game. The results show that in the tripartite game, the more the expected revenue of government departments, enterprises, and the public increases, the more likely it is that the government departments will adopt a strict supervision strategy and the company will choose to assume social responsibility. The higher the cost of government supervision, the higher the cost of corporate social responsibility, and the more the loss of social welfare. Then the government department adopts a general regulatory strategy, and the company chooses not to assume social responsibility, the more likely the public will give negative evaluation of the company. The conclusion is that the strict supervision of the government supervision department has greatly increased the penalty ‘cost of enterprises’ failure to perform social responsibility. This helps enterprises to consciously perform social responsibility, and thus get positive comments from the public.

为了分析企业社会责任的博弈关系，本文采用演化博弈理论，以政府监督，企业和公众为三方博弈的主体，构建了混合策略的动态博弈。结果表明，在三方博弈中，政府部门，企业和公众的预期收入增加得越多，政府部门将采取严格的监督策略，公司选择承担社会责任的可能性就越大。政府监管的成本越高，企业社会责任的成本就越高，社会福利的损失也就越大。然后，政府部门采取了总体监管策略，公司选择不承担社会责任，公众对公司做出负面评价的可能性就越大。结论是，政府监督部门的严格监督大大增加了企业履行社会责任的惩罚“企业成本”。这有助于企业自觉履行社会责任，从而得到公众的积极评价。