In this paper, from the perspective of game theory, we study the impact of price subsidy and fairness concern on the pricing strategies and benefits of members in the take-away industry. In the single-channel supply chain, we build a Stackelberg game model between the take-away platform and the restaurant for the online take-away business. By comparing and analyzing the product pricing and revenue in the cases of no price subsidy and price subsidy, we obtain the optimal pricing strategy for both parties. In the dual-channel supply chain, we explore the benefits of supply chain members under the combined effects of fairness concern and price subsidy. Under the single channel price subsidy model, we find that restaurant always raises prices, and the price increase is directly proportional to the subsidy intensity. Such a proper price increase always brings more benefits to both parties. Under the dual-channel model, consumer fairness concern may curb the price increase behavior of restaurants. Regardless of the model, in the long term, the optimal subsidy of the platform will decrease with the expansion of the online take-away market.

本文从博弈论的角度，研究了价格补贴和公平问题对外卖行业成员定价策略和利益的影响。在单渠道供应链中，我们在外卖平台和餐厅之间建立了Stackelberg游戏模型，用于在线外卖业务。通过对没有价格补贴和没有价格补贴的情况下的产品定价和收益进行比较和分析，得出双方的最优定价策略。在双渠道供应链中，我们在公平关注和价格补贴的共同作用下探索供应链成员的利益。在单渠道价格补贴模型下，我们发现餐厅总是在提价，价格上涨与补贴强度成正比。这样适当的涨价总会给双方带来更多利益。在双渠道模式下，消费者公平的担忧可能会抑制餐馆的提价行为。无论采用哪种模式，从长期来看，随着在线外卖市场的扩大，该平台的最佳补贴将减少。