Nowadays, buy-online-and-pick-up-in-store (BOPS) is a popular sales project to promote product sales. Implementing BOPS in the dual-channel low-carbon supply chain (DLSC) can not only improve low-carbon manufacturers’ profit but also reduce energy consumption in it. This paper focuses on how to design the contract which can ensure the implementation of BOPS in the DLSC consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer considering consumers’ low-carbon preference. Based on the analysis of game theory, two kinds of BOPS contract (MW contract with the dominant manufacturer making decision on wholesale price and RW contract with the dominant retailer making decision on wholesale price) with fixed compensation are designed and compared to obtain the better contract which is more effective on the implementation of BOPS. The findings show that MW contract is better than RW contract for the DLSC to implement BOPS. When consumers’ low-carbon preference and BOPS preference and the anti-cross-price elasticity are high enough, the DLSC can implement BOPS under the MW contract because it has Pareto efficiency on the profit of the original DLSC. We further find the sales price is decreasing in consumers’ low-carbon preference and anti-cross-price elasticity, while the wholesale price is increasing in consumers’ low-carbon preference. Finally, the results are verified by numerical examples.

中文翻译：

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考虑消费者的低碳偏好，设计双通道低碳供应链的门店提货（BOPS）合同

如今，在线购买和提货（BOPS）是一个受欢迎的销售项目，旨在促进产品销售。在双通道低​​碳供应链（DLSC）中实施BOPS不仅可以提高低碳制造商的利润，而且可以减少其中的能耗。本文重点讨论如何设计合同，以确保在考虑消费者低碳偏好的一个制造商和一个零售商组成的DLSC中实施BOPS。在博弈分析的基础上，设计并比较了两种具有固定补偿的BOPS合同（由占主导地位的制造商决定批发价格的MW合同和由占主导地位的零售商决定批发价格的RW合同），并获得比较好的合同。这对实施BOPS更有效。研究结果表明，对于DLSC实施BOPS而言，MW合同优于RW合同。当消费者的低碳偏好和BOPS偏好以及反交叉价格弹性足够高时，由于DLSC在原始DLSC的利润上具有帕累托效率，因此DLSC可以根据MW合同实施BOPS。我们进一步发现，消费者低碳偏好和反交叉价格弹性的销售价格正在下降，而消费者低碳偏好的批发价格正在上升。最后，通过数值算例验证了结果。我们进一步发现，消费者低碳偏好和反交叉价格弹性的销售价格正在下降，而消费者低碳偏好的批发价格正在上升。最后，通过数值算例验证了结果。我们进一步发现，消费者低碳偏好和反交叉价格弹性的销售价格正在下降，而消费者低碳偏好的批发价格正在上升。最后，通过数值算例验证了结果。