This study establishes a two-echelon supply chain with one manufacturer who invests in energy-saving products (ESPs) and one retailer who sells the products and may possess demand-forecast advantage. Considering government subsidy and consumer preference for ESPs and a random demand, we develop a four-stage Stackelberg game model to research the optimal strategies of the information investment and sharing of the retailer and the energy-saving R&D of the manufacturer. The results show the following: (1) When incurring a low information investment cost, the retailer is willing to invest in information acquisition techniques, while the retailer agreeing to share market information is related to the government subsidies and the probability of a high demand. The optimal strategy for the retailer is to share information when the probability of a high demand is less than 50% and the government subsidies for ESPs are high. Otherwise, the optimal strategy is not to share information. (2) The manufacturer not always expects the retailer to share information, which depends on the probability of a high demand and manufacturing cost. Especially, when the probability of a high demand is less than 50%, only a manufacturer incurring high cost will expect. (3) If the retailer refuses to share the information, the manufacturer can motivate the retailer to change his/her decision by sharing the information investment cost.

中文翻译：

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政府补贴和节能产品消费者偏好下的两级供应链信息投资共享

这项研究建立了一个两级供应链，其中有一家制造商投资节能产品（ESP），而另一家零售商出售该产品，并且可能拥有需求预测优势。考虑到政府对ESP的补贴和消费者偏好以及随机需求，我们开发了一个四阶段Stackelberg博弈模型，研究零售商信息投资和共享以及制造商的节能研发的最佳策略。结果表明：（1）当信息投资成本较低时，零售商愿意投资于信息获取技术，而同意共享市场信息的零售商则与政府补贴和高需求的可能性有关。对于零售商来说，最佳策略是在高需求概率小于50％并且政府对ESP的补贴很高时共享信息。否则，最佳策略是不共享信息。（2）制造商并非总是希望零售商共享信息，这取决于高需求的可能性和制造成本。尤其是，当高需求的可能性小于50％时，仅期望产生高成本的制造商。（3）如果零售商拒绝共享信息，则制造商可以通过分担信息投资成本来促使零售商改变其决定。（2）制造商并不总是希望零售商共享信息，这取决于高需求的可能性和制造成本。尤其是，当高需求的可能性小于50％时，仅期望产生高成本的制造商。（3）如果零售商拒绝共享信息，则制造商可以通过分担信息投资成本来促使零售商改变其决定。（2）制造商并不总是希望零售商共享信息，这取决于高需求的可能性和制造成本。尤其是，当高需求的可能性小于50％时，仅期望产生高成本的制造商。（3）如果零售商拒绝共享信息，则制造商可以通过分担信息投资成本来促使零售商改变其决定。