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Cooperation under institutional incentives with perfect and imperfect observation
Physics Letters A ( IF 2.6 ) Pub Date : 2020-10-01 , DOI: 10.1016/j.physleta.2020.126723
Shiping Gao , Jinling Liang

Abstract Understanding the evolution of cooperation is a challenging topic in various realms. Increasing attention has been paid to exploring the effects of incentives on the emergence of cooperation. Most of the extant studies have implicitly assumed that the cost of incentives is fixed and independent of the individual's payoff. In human societies, taxation is one important source of funds for supporting the government of individuals and nearly involves everyone. Inspired by this phenomenon, we institute an analytic model where the incentives are established based on the tax regime. Individuals play the prisoner's dilemma game and the ones whose payoffs are greater than zero have to contribute a part as taxes to establish an institution to monitor individuals' behaviors and execute incentives. We investigate the emergence of cooperation under the institutional incentives and make a comparative analysis between reward and punishment subject to the perfect and imperfect environment.

中文翻译:

制度激励下的合作,完善和不完善的观察

摘要 理解合作的演变是各个领域的一个具有挑战性的课题。探索激励对合作出现的影响越来越受到重视。大多数现存的研究都隐含地假设激励的成本是固定的,独立于个人的回报。在人类社会中,税收是支持个人治理的重要资金来源之一,几乎涉及所有人。受这一现象的启发,我们建立了一个基于税收制度建立激励措施的分析模型。个人在玩囚徒困境游戏,收益大于零的人必须贡献一部分作为税收,以建立一个制度来监控个人的行为并执行激励措施。
更新日期:2020-10-01
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