What networks can form and persist when agents are self-interested? Can such networks be efficient? A substantial theoretical literature predicts that various networks emerge randomly and efficiency is unlikely to be sustained, but these predictions are in stark contrast to empirical findings. In this paper, we present a new model of network formation. In contrast to the existing literature, we assume that agents are foresighted (rather than myopic) and have some but not necessarily all information about the history. We provide a tight characterization of the sustainable networks; in particular, efficient networks can form and persist if they provide every agent a strictly positive payoff. Our results are robust to model variations, while evidence from empirical networks suggests a modest improvement in prediction by our model compared with models with agent myopia.

中文翻译：

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具有前瞻性代理的动态网络形成

当代理自利时，哪些网络可以形成并持续存在？这样的网络能有效吗？大量理论文献预测，各种网络随机出现，效率不太可能持续，但这些预测与实证结果形成鲜明对比。在本文中，我们提出了一种新的网络形成模型。与现有文献相比，我们假设代理是有远见的（而不是近视的）并且拥有一些但不一定是关于历史的全部信息。我们提供了可持续网络的严格特征；特别是，如果有效的网络为每个代理提供严格的正回报，则可以形成并持续存在。我们的结果对模型变化是稳健的，