I study sequential first-price auctions where two items are sold to two bidders with private binary valuations. A seller, prior to the second auction, can publicly disclose some information about the outcome of the first auction. I characterize equilibrium strategies for various disclosure rules when the valuations of bidders are either perfectly positively or perfectly negatively correlated across items. I establish outcome equivalence between different disclosure rules. I find that it is optimal for the seller to disclose some information when the valuations are negatively correlated, whereas it is optimal not to disclose any information when the valuations are positively correlated. For most of the parameter values, the seller’s expected revenue is higher if the losing bid is disclosed. When only the winner’s identity is disclosed, the equilibrium is efficient whether the valuations are positively or negatively correlated.

中文翻译：

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卖方在连续最高价拍卖中的信息披露

我研究了连续的最高价格拍卖，其中两件物品以私人二元估值出售给两个竞标者。在第二次拍卖之前，卖方可以公开披露有关第一次拍卖结果的一些信息。当投标人的估值在项目之间完全正相关或完全负相关时，我描述了各种披露规则的均衡策略。我建立了不同披露规则之间的结果等效性。我发现当估值呈负相关时，卖方最好披露一些信息，而当估值呈正相关时，最好不披露任何信息。对于大多数参数值，如果披露失败的出价，则卖方的预期收入更高。当只有获胜者的身份被公开时，