I study the following repeated version of Nash’s Demand Game: whenever the demands are not jointly compatible, the player who stated the lower demand (the less greedy player) obtains the following advantage: his offer is the only one “on the table”, and the greedier player needs to respond to this offer by either accepting it (which terminates the game) or rejecting it (which triggers a one-period delay and a re-start of the game). If the feasible set is regular—meaning that the egalitarian point is also utilitarian—the game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium. The equilibrium outcome is an immediate agreement on the egalitarian point. Regularity of a feasible set is a weakening of symmetry. Under some equilibrium refinement, regularity can be dispensed with.

中文翻译：

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在动态纳什需求博弈中奖励适度行为

我研究了以下重复版本的纳什需求博弈：当需求不共同兼容时，提出较低需求的玩家（越不贪婪的玩家）获得以下优势：他的提议是唯一“摆在桌面上”的提议，并且贪婪的玩家需要通过接受（终止游戏）或拒绝（触发一段延迟并重新开始游戏）来响应此提议。如果可行集是正则的——这意味着均等点也是功利的——博弈有一个独特的子博弈完美均衡。均衡结果是在平等点上立即达成一致。可行集的正则性是对称性的弱化。在一些平衡细化下，可以免除规律性。