Abstract This paper proposes a supply chain game that is composed of two firms, one supplier and one retailer. The supplier sells goods to the retailer and sets the service strategy efforts. The retailer determines the optimal quantity to purchase and the selling price. The supply chain can be managed through either a traditional online platform or a blockchain. In the former, firms face business risks due to delivery and service and also pay high transaction costs. In the latter, they work on a blockchain platform, remove all risks over the supply chain, and save the transaction costs. However, the blockchain requires initial implementation investments as well as variable costs. Furthermore, the firms gain in terms of visibility, transparency, and security, which are summarized in tokens. We identify the conditions and the stochastic cases in which the blockchain is not worth implementing. Then, we investigate the suitability of a smart wholesale price contract and a smart revenue sharing contract to better coordinate firms’ relationships and negotiations. We highlight all cases in which the use of smart contracts makes blockchain applications more operationally convenient and economically appealing.

中文翻译：

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供应链管理中的区块链和智能合约：博弈论模型

摘要 本文提出了一个由两个厂商组成的供应链博弈，一个供应商和一个零售商。供应商向零售商销售商品并制定服务策略。零售商确定最佳购买数量和销售价格。供应链可以通过传统的在线平台或区块链进行管理。在前者中，企业因交付和服务而面临商业风险，并支付高昂的交易成本。在后者中，他们在区块链平台上工作，消除了供应链上的所有风险，并节省了交易成本。然而，区块链需要初始实施投资以及可变成本。此外，公司在可见性、透明度和安全性方面获得了收益，这些都以代币形式进行了总结。我们确定了区块链不值得实施的条件和随机情况。然后，我们调查了智能批发价格合同和智能收入分享合同的适用性，以更好地协调公司的关系和谈判。我们强调了使用智能合约使区块链应用程序在操作上更加方便和更具经济吸引力的所有案例。