In this paper, we consider the security problem of dynamic state estimations in cyber–physical systems (CPSs) when the sensors are compromised by false data injection (FDI) attacks with complete stealthiness. The FDI attacks with complete stealthiness can completely remove its influences on monitored residuals, which have better stealthy performance against residual-based detectors than existing FDI attacks. Based on self-generated FDI attacks that are independent of real-time data of CPSs, we propose the necessary and sufficient condition of attack parameters such that FDI attacks can achieve complete stealthiness. Furthermore, we introduce the energy stealthiness of FDI attacks, which is a special case of complete stealthiness and makes the accumulated attack energy on residuals is bounded. Then, the existence and design conditions of FDI attacks with energy stealthiness are given. Finally, the superiority of the FDI attacks with complete stealthiness is demonstrated by the IEEE 6 bus power system.

在本文中，当传感器受到具有完全隐身性的错误数据注入（FDI）攻击所危害时，我们考虑了网络物理系统（CPS）中动态状态估计的安全性问题。具有完全隐身性的FDI攻击可以完全消除其对受监视残差的影响，与现有FDI攻击相比，这些残差对基于残差的检测器具有更好的隐秘性能。基于独立于CPS实时数据的自生FDI攻击，我们提出了攻击参数的充要条件，以使FDI攻击可以完全隐身。此外，我们介绍了FDI攻击的能量隐身性，这是完全隐身性的特例，它使对残差的累积攻击能有界。然后，给出了具有能量隐身性的FDI攻击的存在和设计条件。最后，IEEE 6总线电源系统证明了FDI攻击具有完全隐身性的优越性。