Methods of previous researches on green technology innovation will have difficulty in finite population. One solution is the use of stochastic evolutionary game dynamic-Moran process. In this paper we study stochastic dynamic games about green technology innovation with a two-stage free riding problem. Results illustrate the incentive and selection strength play positive roles in promoting participant to be more useful to society, but with threshold effect: too slighted strength makes no effect due to the randomness of the evolution process in finite population. Two-stage free riding problem can be solved with the use of inequality incentives, however, higher inequality can make policy achieves faster but more unstable, so there would be an optimal range. In this paper we provided the key variables of green technology innovation incentive and principles for the environmental regulation policy making. Also reminded that it’s difficult to formulate policies reasonably and make them achieve the expected results.

先前有关绿色技术创新的研究方法将在有限的人口中遇到困难。一种解决方案是使用随机进化游戏动态莫兰过程。在本文中，我们研究具有两阶段搭便车问题的关于绿色技术创新的随机动态博弈。结果表明，激励和选择力量在促进参与者对社会更有用方面起着积极的作用，但具有阈值效应：由于有限的种群进化过程的随机性，太弱的力量没有任何作用。使用不平等激励措施可以解决两阶段的搭便车问题，但是，更高的不平等可以使政策实现更快但更不稳定，因此将存在一个最佳范围。在本文中，我们提供了绿色技术创新激励的关键变量以及环境监管政策制定的原则。还提醒您，很难合理制定政策并使之达到预期效果。