Growth in environmental sustainability has prompted the logistics industry to seek sustainable development, and carbon tax policies are considered an effective approach to reducing carbon emissions. This study investigates the optimization of sustainable transportation and inventory under a carbon tax policy and explores effective methods for coordinating the interests of governments and enterprises. The results can provide insights into sustainable logistics for decision-making by enterprises and policy-making by governments. We first examine a Stackelberg game model and design an iterative solution to optimize sustainable transportation and inventory under the carbon tax policy. We then establish a three-stage dynamic game model to optimize the wholesale price, carbon tax rate, and proportion of sustainable investment shared by the government. Furthermore, we perform a simulation to identify the optimal solution of the three-stage game, and we compare the simulation results with a numerical example. The results indicate that a carbon tax policy can improve social welfare and the sustainability of transportation and inventory but could hinder corporate profits. An appropriate sustainable investment-sharing strategy could compensate for the shortcomings of the carbon tax policy and result in positive outcomes for governments and enterprises.

中文翻译：

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碳税政策下多人动态博弈的可持续交通和存货集成优化

环境可持续性的增长促使物流业寻求可持续发展，碳税政策被认为是减少碳排放的有效方法。本研究调查了碳税政策下可持续运输和库存的优化，并探索了有效的方法来协调政府和企业的利益。结果可以为企业决策和政府决策提供可持续物流的见解。我们首先研究Stackelberg博弈模型并设计一种迭代解决方案，以根据碳税政策优化可持续运输和库存。然后，我们建立一个三阶段的动态博弈模型，以优化批发价格，碳税率和政府共享的可持续投资比例。此外，我们执行仿真以识别三阶段博弈的最优解，并将仿真结果与数值示例进行比较。结果表明，碳税政策可以改善社会福利以及运输和库存的可持续性，但可能会阻碍企业利润。适当的可持续投资共享战略可以弥补碳税政策的不足，并为政府和企业带来积极的成果。