The security for many certificate-based encryption schemes was considered under the ideal condition, where the attackers rarely have the secret state for the solutions. However, with a side-channel attack, attackers can obtain partial secret values of the schemes. In order to make the scheme more practical, the security model for the certificate-based encryption which is resilient to continual leakage is first formalized. The attackers in the security model are permitted to get some secret information continuously through the side-channel attack. Based on the certificate-based key encapsulation scheme, a novel certificate-based encryption scheme is proposed, which is resilient to the continual leakage. In the standard model, the new scheme we propose is proved to be secure under the decisional truncated q-augmented bilinear Diffie–Hellman exponent hard problem and the decisional 1-bilinear Diffie–Hellman inversion hard problem. Additionally, the new scheme can resist the chosen-ciphertext attack. Moreover, a comparison is performed with other related schemes, where the proposed solution further considers the continual leakage-resilient property and exhibits less computation cost.

中文翻译：

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基于证书的加密可恢复标准模型中的持续泄漏

在理想条件下考虑了许多基于证书的加密方案的安全性，在这种情况下，攻击者很少拥有解决方案的秘密状态。但是，通过边信道攻击，攻击者可以获得该方案的部分秘密值。为了使该方案更加实用，首先确定了基于证书的加密的安全模型，该模型可抵抗连续泄漏。安全模型中的攻击者被允许通过边路攻击连续获取一些秘密信息。在基于证书的密钥封装方案的基础上，提出了一种新的基于证书的加密方案，该方案可以抵抗持续的泄漏。在标准模型中，我们提出的新方案在决策截断q下被证明是安全的增强型双线性Diffie-Hellman指数硬问题和决策性1-双线性Diffie-Hellman逆硬问题。此外，新方案可以抵抗选择的密文攻击。此外，与其他相关方案进行了比较，其中所提出的解决方案进一步考虑了连续的渗漏回弹特性，并且显示出较少的计算成本。