In this work, we study a closed-loop supply chain with remanufacturing in a competitive market, where the supply chain is a price taker. A Stackelberg game framework is considered, where a manufacturer (leader) has sufficient channel power over a retailer (follower). We develop analytical models to show that a closed-loop supply chain with remanufacturing in a competitive market can achieve the same return rate as that in the centrally coordinated channel by employing a contract between the manufacturer and the retailer. The contract consists of a wholesale price, and a progressive transfer price scheme with additional allowances (or charges) for the returned products. Our models also take into account the effect of green initiatives on consumers’ purchase intention by relating the green achievement from remanufacturing to consumer demand. In practice, our models can be directly applied to a closed-loop supply chain with remanufacturing in a competitive market.

在这项工作中，我们研究了在竞争激烈的市场中进行再制造的闭环供应链，其中供应链是价格的接受者。考虑了Stackelberg游戏框架，其中制造商（领导者）在零售商（跟随者）上具有足够的渠道力量。我们开发的分析模型表明，通过在制造商和零售商之间订立合同，在竞争性市场中进行再制造的闭环供应链可以实现与集中协调渠道相同的回报率。合同包括批发价格和累进转让价格计划，并为退回产品提供额外的津贴（或费用）。我们的模型还通过将再制造的绿色成就与消费者需求联系起来，考虑了绿色倡议对消费者购买意愿的影响。