It is common for a supplier to sell products to multiple retailers. In this paper, we investigate the equilibrium behavior of a decentralized supply chain with multiple retailers facing a random price-dependent demand in the additive form. Here, we consider two kinds of demand functions: the distribution of the demand depends only on the retailer’s own retail price (noncompeting retailers) and not only on his own retail price but also on that of the other retailers (competing retailers). We present appropriate wholesale price, buy-back, and lost-sales cost-sharing contracts to coordinate the total supply chain, so that when all the retailers adopt their equilibrium response, the supply chain system coordination is also achieved. Furthermore, the coalition formation among retailers is also analyzed. We find that with buy-back and lost-sales cost-sharing contracts and linear price-dependent demand function, retailers always prefer being in the grand coalition to forming any other coalition.

中文翻译：

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价格随机需求下的去中心化供应链：非合作均衡与成本分担合同的协调

供应商通常向多个零售商出售产品。在本文中，我们研究了分散的供应链的均衡行为，其中多个零售商面对以加成形式的随机价格依赖性需求。在这里，我们考虑两种需求函数：需求的分布仅取决于零售商自己的零售价格（不竞争的零售商），不仅取决于他自己的零售价格，而且还取决于其他零售商（竞争性零售商）的价格。我们提出适当的批发价，回购和销售亏损分摊成本的合同来协调整个供应链，以便当所有零售商都采取均衡反应时，也可以实现供应链系统的协调。此外，还分析了零售商之间的联盟形成。