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Auction based game theory in cognitive radio networks for dynamic spectrum allocation
Computers & Electrical Engineering ( IF 4.3 ) Pub Date : 2020-09-01 , DOI: 10.1016/j.compeleceng.2020.106734 D. Sumithra Sofia , A. Shirly Edward
Computers & Electrical Engineering ( IF 4.3 ) Pub Date : 2020-09-01 , DOI: 10.1016/j.compeleceng.2020.106734 D. Sumithra Sofia , A. Shirly Edward
Abstract Cognitive radio is an emerging technology that has a high potential to deal with the scarcity problem in the radio spectrum. Dynamic spectrum access in cognitive networks enhances the efficiency of spectral utilization by cognitive users (unlicensed users). Auction mechanism approach helps the cognitive users to get a part of the unused license band, for a lease, from the primary users (licensed users). Based on the interference constraints, auction methods share the leased band to many cognitive users with negligible mutual interference. Because of this unique feature, the multi-winner auction is a fresh challenge to the existing auction mechanisms like (Vickrey–Clarke-Groves) VCG and Second price auction. The proposed method uses interference-based constraints and satisfaction levels among the cognitive users to select the winner of the pricing based game. In this paper, a new framework plans to manipulate the multi-winner auction mechanism, based upon a pricing strategy to overcome the drawbacks of the traditional mechanisms. The proposed mechanism enhances the spectral efficiency of the cognitive users and also motivates the primary users to lease the bands to the cognitive users, with increased primary user revenue. Fairness among cognitive users ensures this mechanism. Simulation results show that our mechanism increases the spectral efficiency of cognitive users and the revenue of primary users.
中文翻译:
用于动态频谱分配的认知无线电网络中基于拍卖的博弈论
摘要 认知无线电是一种新兴技术,具有解决无线电频谱稀缺问题的巨大潜力。认知网络中的动态频谱接入提高了认知用户(未授权用户)的频谱利用效率。拍卖机制方法帮助认知用户从主要用户(许可用户)那里租用一部分未使用的许可频段。基于干扰约束,拍卖方法将租用频段共享给许多认知用户,相互干扰可忽略不计。由于这种独特的功能,多赢家拍卖对现有的拍卖机制(如(Vickrey-Clarke-Groves)VCG 和第二价格拍卖)提出了新的挑战。所提出的方法使用认知用户之间基于干扰的约束和满意度来选择基于定价的游戏的赢家。在本文中,一个新的框架计划操纵多赢家拍卖机制,基于定价策略来克服传统机制的缺点。所提出的机制提高了认知用户的频谱效率,也激励了初级用户将频段租给了认知用户,从而增加了初级用户的收入。认知用户之间的公平性确保了这种机制。仿真结果表明,我们的机制提高了认知用户的频谱效率和初级用户的收入。基于定价策略来克服传统机制的弊端。所提出的机制提高了认知用户的频谱效率,也激励了初级用户将频段租给了认知用户,从而增加了初级用户的收入。认知用户之间的公平性确保了这种机制。仿真结果表明,我们的机制提高了认知用户的频谱效率和初级用户的收入。基于定价策略来克服传统机制的弊端。所提出的机制提高了认知用户的频谱效率,也激励了初级用户将频段租给了认知用户,从而增加了初级用户的收入。认知用户之间的公平性确保了这种机制。仿真结果表明,我们的机制提高了认知用户的频谱效率和初级用户的收入。
更新日期:2020-09-01
中文翻译:
用于动态频谱分配的认知无线电网络中基于拍卖的博弈论
摘要 认知无线电是一种新兴技术,具有解决无线电频谱稀缺问题的巨大潜力。认知网络中的动态频谱接入提高了认知用户(未授权用户)的频谱利用效率。拍卖机制方法帮助认知用户从主要用户(许可用户)那里租用一部分未使用的许可频段。基于干扰约束,拍卖方法将租用频段共享给许多认知用户,相互干扰可忽略不计。由于这种独特的功能,多赢家拍卖对现有的拍卖机制(如(Vickrey-Clarke-Groves)VCG 和第二价格拍卖)提出了新的挑战。所提出的方法使用认知用户之间基于干扰的约束和满意度来选择基于定价的游戏的赢家。在本文中,一个新的框架计划操纵多赢家拍卖机制,基于定价策略来克服传统机制的缺点。所提出的机制提高了认知用户的频谱效率,也激励了初级用户将频段租给了认知用户,从而增加了初级用户的收入。认知用户之间的公平性确保了这种机制。仿真结果表明,我们的机制提高了认知用户的频谱效率和初级用户的收入。基于定价策略来克服传统机制的弊端。所提出的机制提高了认知用户的频谱效率,也激励了初级用户将频段租给了认知用户,从而增加了初级用户的收入。认知用户之间的公平性确保了这种机制。仿真结果表明,我们的机制提高了认知用户的频谱效率和初级用户的收入。基于定价策略来克服传统机制的弊端。所提出的机制提高了认知用户的频谱效率,也激励了初级用户将频段租给了认知用户,从而增加了初级用户的收入。认知用户之间的公平性确保了这种机制。仿真结果表明,我们的机制提高了认知用户的频谱效率和初级用户的收入。