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Fairness in hazmat routing-scheduling: A bi-objective Stackelberg game
Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review ( IF 10.6 ) Pub Date : 2020-06-25 , DOI: 10.1016/j.tre.2020.102006
Seyed Sina Mohri , Nasrin Asgari , Reza Zanjirani Farahani , Michael Bourlakis , Benjamin Laker

We investigate a hazmat routing-scheduling problem. To minimize the overall expected risk, various vehicles may take different routes/schedules to avoid multiple accidents on the same link. Therefore, the company envisages two issues: (1) unfairly, a vehicle departing earlier from its origin may arrive earlier at its destination than the others leaving later; (2) focusing only on the minimization of risk may increase travel time/cost incurred by the company. We suggest a bi-objective game-theoretic formulation and solve it by a modified Adaptive Large Neighborhood Search and Simulated Annealing. We test the solution on a real-life case and extract practical insights.



中文翻译:

危险品路由安排中的公平性:双目标Stackelberg游戏

我们调查了危险品路由计划问题。为了最大程度地降低总体预期风险,各种车辆可能会采用不同的路线/时间表,以避免在同一条链路上发生多次事故。因此,公司设想了两个问题:(1)不公平地,一辆车辆从其起点出发较早离开可能会比其他车辆晚些到达。(2)仅着眼于降低风险可能会增加公司的旅行时间/成本。我们提出了一种双目标博弈论的表述,并通过改进的自适应大邻域搜索和模拟退火来解决。我们在实际案例中测试该解决方案,并提取实际见解。

更新日期:2020-06-25
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