Abstract Deployment of energy management systems in electric utilities has resulted in improvement of situational awareness in power systems. However, additional cyber security issues are introduced in real-time operations. Substantial research has since been dedicated towards the feasibility and formulation of coordinated cyber-physical attacks against power systems. However, the full extent of their impacts contributing to cascading failures is not widely explored. This paper investigates to what extent such coordinated attacks against power system state estimation lead to large scale blackouts. To consider the worst case scenarios, false data injection attacks against parameter-based remedial action schemes are investigated on realistic power networks under large inter-area power transfers. Additionally, three indices are proposed to quantify the severity of the post-attack impacts: Loss of Observability after Cascading Failures, Loss of Observability after Controlled Islanding and Lines Recoverable after Controlled Islanding. The three indices will enable system operators to estimate the extent of recoverability of the grid after attacks have adversely impacted the power grid. All simulations are carried on synthetic Illinois 200-bus and South Carolina 500-bus systems.

中文翻译：

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虚假数据注入攻击对补救行动方案的影响

摘要 在电力设施中部署能源管理系统已导致电力系统态势感知的改善。然而，在实时操作中引入了额外的网络安全问题。此后，大量研究致力于针对电力系统的协同网络物理攻击的可行性和制定。然而，它们对级联故障的影响的全部范围并未得到广泛探讨。本文研究了这种针对电力系统状态估计的协同攻击在多大程度上导致大规模停电。为了考虑最坏的情况，在大型区域间电力传输下的现实电力网络上研究了针对基于参数的补救措施方案的虚假数据注入攻击。此外，提出了三个指标来量化攻击后影响的严重程度：级联故障后的可观测性丧失、受控孤岛后的可观测性丧失和受控孤岛后可恢复的线路。这三个指标将使系统运营商能够估计攻击对电网造成不利影响后电网的可恢复程度。所有模拟都是在合成的伊利诺伊州 200 总线和南卡罗来纳州 500 总线系统上进行的。