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Effects of strategy-updating cost on evolutionary spatial prisoner’s dilemma game
Applied Mathematics and Computation ( IF 4 ) Pub Date : 2020-12-01 , DOI: 10.1016/j.amc.2020.125445
Run-Ran Liu , Chun-Xiao Jia , Zhihai Rong

Abstract Strategy-updating rules play fundamental roles for the persistence of cooperation in groups composed by selfish individuals. In this paper, we study the spatial evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game with the introduction of the strategy-updating cost for players, where each player is able to update its strategy if its payoffs is greater than a critical threshold. We show that there exist sudden increases of cooperation level as the temptation to defect increases for a fixed strategy-updating cost, which means a larger temptation to defect cannot always inveigle players into defection, but sometimes promote players to cooperate. This striking phenomenon is in contradiction with the previous wide cognition that a larger temptation to defect always gives rise to a lower cooperation level. This abnormal phenomenon can be explained by a systematic analysis of the payoffs earned by cooperators and defectors and the strategy-transition probabilities between cooperation and defection, respectively. In some cases, the strategy-updating cost can prevent some defectors from becoming cooperators and the increase of temptation to defect enable their payoffs to exceed the threshold of strategy-updating cost. Our results prove that the temptation to defect may have facilitation to the emergence of cooperation in the existence of strategy-updating cost, and thus provide a new understanding of the previously hidden roles of the temptation to defect for the social cooperation.

中文翻译:

策略更新成本对进化空间囚徒困境博弈的影响

摘要 策略更新规则对于自私个体组成的群体中合作的持久性起着基础性作用。在本文中,我们通过引入博弈者的策略更新成本来研究空间进化囚徒困境博弈,其中每个博弈者如果其收益大于临界阈值,则能够更新其策略。我们表明,在固定策略更新成本的情况下,随着叛逃诱惑的增加,合作水平会突然增加,这意味着更大的叛逃诱惑不能总是诱使玩家叛逃,但有时会促进玩家合作。这一惊人的现象与之前的广泛认知相矛盾,即更大的背叛诱惑总是导致较低的合作水平。这种异常现象可以通过对合作者和叛逃者所获得的回报以及合作与叛逃之间的战略转换概率分别进行系统分析来解释。在某些情况下,策略更新成本可以阻止一些叛逃者成为合作者,而叛逃诱惑的增加使他们的收益超过策略更新成本的阈值。我们的研究结果证明,在存在战略更新成本的情况下,背叛诱惑可能促进了合作的出现,从而为社会合作中背叛诱惑的先前隐藏作用提供了新的认识。策略更新成本可以阻止一些叛逃者成为合作者,而叛逃诱惑的增加使他们的收益超过策略更新成本的阈值。我们的研究结果证明,在存在战略更新成本的情况下,背叛诱惑可能促进了合作的出现,从而为社会合作中背叛诱惑的先前隐藏作用提供了新的认识。策略更新成本可以阻止一些叛逃者成为合作者,而叛逃诱惑的增加使他们的收益超过策略更新成本的阈值。我们的研究结果证明,在存在战略更新成本的情况下,背叛诱惑可能促进了合作的出现,从而为社会合作中背叛诱惑的先前隐藏作用提供了新的认识。
更新日期:2020-12-01
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