One of the main motivations behind introducing PUFs was their ability to resist physical attacks. Among them, cloning was the major concern of related scientific literature. Several primitive PUF designs have been introduced to the community, and several machine learning attacks have been shown capable of modeling such constructions. Although a few works have expressed how to make use of Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) leakage of PUF constructions to significantly improve the modeling attacks, little attention has been paid to provide corresponding countermeasures. In this paper, we present a generic technique to operate any PUF primitive in an SCA-secure fashion. We, for the first time, make it possible to apply a provably-secure masking countermeasure – Threshold Implementation (TI) – on a strong PUF design. As a case study, we concentrate on the Interpose PUF and based on practical experiments on an FPGA prototype, we demonstrate the ability of our construction to prevent the recovery of intermediate values through SCA measurements.

中文翻译：

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TI-PUF：面向旁通道的物理不可克隆功能

引入PUF的主要动机之一是其抵抗物理攻击的能力。其中，克隆是相关科学文献的主要关注点。已经向社区介绍了几种原始的PUF设计，并且已经显示了能够对这种构造进行建模的几种机器学习攻击。尽管一些工作已经表达了如何利用PUF结构的边通道分析（SCA）泄漏来显着改善建模攻击，但很少有人注意提供相应的对策。在本文中，我们提出了一种通用技术，可以以SCA安全的方式操作任何PUF原语。我们第一次使应用可证明安全的方法成为可能掩蔽对策-阈值实施（TI）-基于强大的PUF设计。作为案例研究，我们专注于Interpose PUF，并基于FPGA原型上的实际实验，证明了我们的构造能够防止通过SCA测量恢复中间值。