According to the standard protocol of spatial public goods game, a cooperator player invests not only into his own game but also into the games organized by neighboring partners. In this work, we relax this assumption by allowing cooperators to decide which neighboring group to prefer instead of supporting them uniformly. In particular, we assume that they select their most successful neighbor and focus external investments exclusively into the related group. We show that this very simple alteration of the dynamical rule results in a surprisingly positive evolutionary outcome -- cooperators prevail even in harsh environment represented by small values of the synergy factor in the game. The microscopic mechanism behind the reported success of the cooperator strategy can be explained by a blocking mechanism which affects the propagations of competing strategies in a biased way. Our results, which remain intact by using different interaction topologies, reveal that it could be beneficial to concentrate individual efforts to reach a higher global wellbeing.

中文翻译：

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通过关注最成功的合作伙伴来阻止叛逃者入侵

根据空间公共产品游戏的标准协议，合作玩家不仅要投资自己的游戏，还要投资周边合作伙伴组织的游戏。在这项工作中，我们通过允许合作者决定更喜欢哪个相邻组而不是统一支持他们来放宽这一假设。特别是，我们假设他们选择了他们最成功的邻居，并将外部投资完全集中在相关群体上。我们表明，动态规则的这种非常简单的改变导致了令人惊讶的积极进化结果——即使在游戏中协同因子的小值所代表的恶劣环境中，合作者也会占上风。报道的合作者策略成功背后的微观机制可以通过阻塞机制来解释，该机制以有偏见的方式影响竞争策略的传播。我们的结果通过使用不同的交互拓扑保持不变，表明集中个人努力以实现更高的全球福祉可能是有益的。