Human cerebral organoids (HCOs) are miniature brains cultivated in a dish using pluripotent human cells that, thanks to advanced technologies, tend to reproduce the development path of the brain of an embryo in the mother’s uterus. Recent data from studies carried out in different laboratories have indicated that HCOs show complex electrical activity, are receptive to light stimuli, and can command a muscle connected to them. The presence of the main neuronal structures in them suggests that, despite currently lacking vascularization and sensory exchanges with the outside world, more developed HCOs could exhibit some rudimentary form of consciousness, specifically a minimal sentience with respect to the basic experiences of pain and pleasure. Faced with this possibility, which for many scientists is still a long way off, we have begun to reflect on how we could empirically investigate the presence of consciousness. If we were certain or had a reasonable belief that some types of HCOs are sentient, what kind of entity would we judge them to be? Would they have specific legal protection? Should they be attributed to a moral status? This article tries to give an initial answer to these two questions. On the one side, it seems that no special rights can be claimed for HCOs other than those relating to human biological material. On the other side, instead, a sentient HCO could aspire to having its moral status recognized. If this were the case, the law may have to adapt to this unprecedented situation.

中文翻译：

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人脑有机体是新的法律和道德挑战^†

人脑类器官（HCO）是使用多能人类细胞培养在培养皿中的微型大脑，由于先进技术的缘故，它们倾向于在母亲子宫中重现胚胎大脑的发育路径。来自不同实验室的研究的最新数据表明，HCO具有复杂的电活动，可以接受光刺激，并且可以控制与之相连的肌肉。它们中主要神经元结构的存在表明，尽管目前缺乏血管形成和与外界的感官交流，但更发达的HCO可能表现出一些基本的意识形式，特别是对疼痛和愉悦的基本体验的最低程度的知觉。面对这种可能性，对于许多科学家来说，还有很长的路要走，我们已经开始思考如何可以凭经验调查意识的存在。如果我们确定或合理地相信某些类型的HCO是有感情的，那么我们将其判断为哪种实体？他们会受到具体的法律保护吗？是否应该将它们归因于道德地位？本文试图给出这两个问题的初步答案。一方面，似乎除了与人类生物材料有关的权利外，对HCO不能享有任何特殊权利。另一方面，有意识的HCO可能希望获得其道德地位的认可。如果是这种情况，法律可能必须适应这种前所未有的情况。我们会判断他们是什么样的实体？他们会受到具体的法律保护吗？是否应该将它们归因于道德地位？本文试图给出这两个问题的初步答案。一方面，似乎除了与人类生物材料有关的权利外，对HCO不能享有任何特殊权利。另一方面，有意识的HCO可能希望获得其道德地位的认可。如果是这样，法律可能必须适应这种前所未有的情况。我们会判断他们是什么样的实体？他们会受到具体的法律保护吗？是否应该将它们归因于道德地位？本文试图给出这两个问题的初步答案。一方面，似乎除了与人类生物材料有关的权利外，对HCO不能享有任何特殊权利。另一方面，有意识的HCO可能希望获得其道德地位的认可。如果是这种情况，法律可能必须适应这种前所未有的情况。有见识的HCO可能渴望获得其道德地位的认可。如果是这种情况，法律可能必须适应这种前所未有的情况。有见识的HCO可能渴望获得其道德地位的认可。如果是这种情况，法律可能必须适应这种前所未有的情况。