Abstract

Dynamic theoretic game models for the coordination of private and social interests of agents in the concept of the sustainable development (SD) of the dynamic system controlled by them are investigated. Within this concept, the hierarchical control mechanisms—methods of administrative control and inducement—are formalized as solutions of hierarchical differential games with the phase constraints reflecting the requirements for the state of the controlled dynamic system providing the conditions for SD. Administrative control involves the impact of the leading player (the subject of managing SD) on the set of admissible controls for the followers (the subject of the impact on the controlled dynamic system); and the incentive, on his payoff function. Mechanisms of administrative and economic management are formalized as computer imitation scenarios. The dynamic models considered in the article are the development of the models for the coordination of private and social interests proposed by Yu.B. Germeyer and I.A. Vatel. Numerical calculations are carried out and a comparative analysis of the effectiveness of these control mechanisms for the fisheries’ model is fulfilled.

中文翻译：

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调节渔业利益协调中的理论博弈模型的求解方法

摘要

研究了在代理人控制的动态系统的可持续发展（SD）概念中协调代理人的私人利益和社会利益的动态理论博弈模型。在这个概念内，层级控制机制（行政控制和诱导方法）被形式化为层级差分博弈的解决方案，其相位约束反映了为SD提供条件的受控动态系统状态的要求。行政控制涉及领导者（管理SD的主体）对追随者的可允许控制集的影响（对受控动态系统的影响的主体）；和激励，这是他的回报功能。行政和经济管理机制被正式定义为计算机模仿方案。本文考虑的动态模型是Yu.B.提出的协调私人和社会利益模型的发展。Germeyer和IA Vatel。进行了数值计算，并对这些控制机制对渔业模型的有效性进行了比较分析。