Abstract

Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems can be subject to cyber-attacks due to their extensive connectivity to information and communication technologies. Those communications are used to connect sensors, actuators, and programmable logic controllers (PLCs) to monitor and control the process. The use of communication networks enlarges the vulnerability of SCADA to cyber-attacks that can drive the system to unsafe states. A variety of approaches in the field of attack detection have been proposed, however they are characterized very expensive, low detection rate or are system specific. One of the powerful cyber-attacks targeting SCADA systems is deception attack, where the attacker can change sensor reading parameters. In this work, we propose a new defense strategy that detects parameter changes generated by deception attacks in the sensor and control part in supervisory control systems. To do so, we use the bond graph (BG) modeling tool.

中文翻译：

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使用邦德图检测监控系统中的欺骗攻击

摘要

监视控制和数据采集（SCADA）系统由于与信息和通信技术的广泛连接而可能遭受网络攻击。这些通信用于连接传感器，执行器和可编程逻辑控制器（PLC），以监视和控制过程。通信网络的使用扩大了SCADA对网络攻击的脆弱性，这些攻击可能会使系统进入不安全状态。已经提出了攻击检测领域中的各种方法，但是它们的特征是非常昂贵，检测率低或特定于系统。针对SCADA系统的强大网络攻击之一是欺骗攻击，攻击者可以在其中更改传感器读取参数。在这项工作中 我们提出了一种新的防御策略，该策略可检测监视控制系统的传感器和控制部分中的欺骗攻击所产生的参数变化。为此，我们使用键图（BG）建模工具。