Abstract We consider financing and coordinating issues in a supply chain with one supplier (she) and one manufacturer (he), where the supplier is capital-constrained and her production yield is random. Facing shortage of capital, the supplier may use two financing sources to facilitate her production: bank loan from a commercial bank, or advance payment from the manufacturer. Taking the supply chain with centralized control as a benchmark, we analyze the optimal decisions of the two members in the supply chain. We find that in the optimal decisions, the supplier chooses only one, instead of a combination, of the two financing sources, and the manufacturer is always willing to pay in advance to finance the supplier’s production. Furthermore, we propose to use the pay back contract (as well as cost-sharing contract as an extension) for the manufacturer to share the production risk and stimulate the supplier to improve the production yield. Finally, assuming the bargaining process of the supplier and the manufacturer being a Nash bargaining game, we show that the pay back contract under the two sources of financing (bank loan and advance payment) can coordinate the supply chain and flexibly allocate the total profit in the supply chain.

中文翻译：

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在收益不确定的情况下为资金受限的供应商融资和协调供应链

摘要 我们考虑了一个供应商（她）和一个制造商（他）的供应链中的融资和协调问题，其中供应商受到资本约束，其产量是随机的。面对资金短缺，供应商可以通过两种融资渠道来促进生产：商业银行的银行贷款，或制造商的预付款。我们以集中控制的供应链为基准，分析供应链中两个成员的最优决策。我们发现在最优决策中，供应商只选择两种融资来源中的一种，而不是组合，制造商总是愿意提前支付为供应商的生产提供资金。此外，我们建议使用回报合同（以及成本分摊合同作为延伸）让制造商分担生产风险，激励供应商提高生产良率。最后，假设供应商和制造商的讨价还价过程是一个纳什讨价还价博弈，我们证明两种融资来源（银行贷款和预付款）下的还款合同可以协调供应链，灵活分配总利润。供应链。