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Optimal Growth in Repeated Matching Platforms: Options versus Adoption
arXiv - CS - Computer Science and Game Theory Pub Date : 2020-05-21 , DOI: arxiv-2005.10731
Irene Lo; Vahideh Manshadi; Scott Rodilitz; Ali Shameli

We study the design of a decentralized platform in which workers and jobs repeatedly match, and their future engagement with the platform depends on whether they successfully find a match. The platform offers two types of matches to workers: an "adopted match" which entails repeatedly matching with the same job or a one-time match. Due to randomness in match compatibility, adoption seems favorable as it reduces uncertainty in matching. However, high adoption levels reduce the number of available jobs, which in turn can suppress future worker engagement if the remaining workers cannot find a match. To optimally resolve the trade-off between adoption and maintaining available options, we develop a random market model that captures the heterogeneity in workers' future engagement based on match type. Our analysis reveals that the optimal policy for maximizing the matching in a single period is either full or no adoption. For sufficiently thick markets, we show that the optimal single-period policy is also optimal for maximizing the total discounted number of matches. In thinner markets, even though a static policy of full or no adoption can be suboptimal, it achieves a constant-factor approximation where the factor improves with market thickness.
更新日期:2020-05-21

 

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