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Sequential Fundraising and Social Insurance
arXiv - CS - Computer Science and Game Theory Pub Date : 2020-05-21 , DOI: arxiv-2005.10711
Amir Ban; Moran Koren

Seed fundraising for ventures often takes place by sequentially approaching potential contributors, whose decisions are observed by other contributors. The fundraising succeeds when a target number of investments is reached. When a single investment suffices, this setting resembles the classic information cascades model. However, when more than one investment is needed, the solution is radically different and exhibits surprising complexities. We analyze a setting where contributors' levels of information are i.i.d. draws from a known distribution, and find strategies in equilibrium for all. We show that participants rely on {\em social insurance}, i.e., invest despite having unfavorable private information, relying on future player strategies to protect them from loss. {\em Delegation} is an extreme form of social insurance where a contributor will unconditionally invest, effectively delegating the decision to future players. In a typical fundraising, early contributors will invest unconditionally, stopping when the target is "close enough", thus {\em de facto} delegating the business of determining fundraising success or failure to the last contributors.
更新日期:2020-05-21

 

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