This paper develops a coupled hydrologic‐economic model that estimates the effects of six tax institutions that theory predicts will lead to equal amounts of aquifer withdrawal. That said, the distributive effects of the tax institutions are expected to differ because each involves different combinations of tax thresholds and side payments (returned tax revenue). The tax policies can lead to groundwater users being worse off than they would be using an unmanaged aquifer. This study explores whether the distributive impacts of specific policies that have equal marginal incentives lead to differences in the behavior of participants in an experiment involving a common pool groundwater resource. The results reveal that each of the tax policies results in approximately the same reduction in resource use but affects participants' earnings and opinions regarding the policies differently. A tax imposed on groundwater use above a threshold and without a side payment is most effective in increasing the net social benefit associated with using the aquifer; participant earnings under that scheme are almost equal to earnings from an unmanaged aquifer (1.04% less), and overall social efficiency is greater (4.34%). Unfortunately, participants tend to prefer an unmanaged aquifer and tax policies with high side‐payments—treatments that led to lower overall social efficiency. The evidence suggests that aquifer management may require a two‐fold approach: (1) a carefully selected threshold that can make water users financially indifferent between a managed and unmanaged aquifer and (2) education to increase the political acceptability of the managed aquifer policy.

中文翻译：

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一些税收比其他税收更好：一项经济实验，分析了空间显性含水层中的地下水管理

本文建立了一个水文-经济耦合模型，该模型估算了理论上预计将导致等量含水层抽取的六个税收制度的影响。也就是说，税务机构的分配效应预计会有所不同，因为它们各自涉及税收起征点和附带付款（返还的税收）的不同组合。税收政策可能导致地下水使用者的状况比使用不受管理的含水层还要糟。这项研究探讨了具有相同边际激励的特定政策的分配影响是否会导致参与者参与共同池地下水资源实验的行为差异。结果显示，每项税收政策都会导致资源使用量减少大致相同，但会影响参与者的 收益和对政策的看法有所不同。对地下水使用量征收超过阈值的税款且无附带费用，这对于增加与使用含水层有关的净社会效益最有效；根据该计划，参与者的收入几乎等于不受管理的含水层的收入（减少1.04％），总体社会效率更高（4.34％）。不幸的是，参与者倾向于使用无管理的含水层和高边际付款的税收政策，这些政策导致整体社会效率降低。有证据表明，含水层管理可能需要采取两种方法：（1）精心选择的阈值可以使用水者在有管理的含水层和无管理的含水层之间在财务上无动于衷；（2）进行教育以提高有管理的含水层政策的政治可接受性。