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The Singaporean model in public goods dilemmas with benevolent leaders and bribery.
Journal of Theoretical Biology ( IF 2 ) Pub Date : 2020-05-22 , DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2020.110345
Yinhai Fang , Matjaž Perc , Haiyan Xu

Public goods dilemmas are at the heart of some of the greatest challenges of our time, including climate inaction, growing inequality, and the overuse of natural resources. The public goods game in which cooperators contribute to a common pool that is then shared equally with defectors who contribute nothing captures the gist of the problem. Cooperators therefore cannot prevail, which ultimately leads to the tragedy of the commons. Actions such as punishment, rewards, and exclusion have been shown to help, but they are costly, therefore rendering cooperators second-order free-riders due to their lack of participation in these actions. In the search for a remedy, we study the public goods game with benevolent leaders who, at a personal cost, have the ability to exclude defectors from using common pool resources. We also consider bribers who can pay the leaders to relax their exclusion efforts. In a traditional setting, this setup yields the standard second-order free-rider problem, where, ironically, the leaders are overcome by cooperators, who then themselves succumb to defectors. We show, however, that the Singaporean model – where a leader’s payoff is determined not only by the regular sharing income from the firm production but also by the success of gross firm production as an incentive – can resolve the second-order free-rider problem. We also show that the detrimental effect of bribery can always be, no matter how high the bribe, held in check as long as the number of individuals engaged in this activity is low compared to the number of benevolent leaders. Otherwise, an abrupt transition to a cooperator-less state becomes unavoidable. We discuss the implications of our research for designing successful cooperation and anti-corruption strategies in public goods dilemmas.



中文翻译:

新加坡式的公共物品困境与仁慈的领导者和贿赂一起。

公共产品的困境是当今时代一些最大挑战的核心,包括气候无所作为,不平等加剧和自然资源过度使用。合作者贡献于一个公共资源的公共物品博弈,然后与无所作为的叛逃者平均分享,抓住了问题的要点。因此,合作者无法取胜,最终导致公地悲剧。惩罚,奖赏和排斥等行动已被证明是有帮助的,但代价高昂,因此,由于缺乏参与,合作伙伴因此成为二阶搭便车者。在寻求补救措施时,我们与仁慈的领导者一起研究公共物品博弈,而这些领导者可以以个人的代价将叛逃者排除在使用公共资源库之外。我们还考虑贿赂者,他们可以向领导人支付薪金以放松他们的排斥工作。在传统情况下,这种设置会产生标准的二阶搭便车问题,具有讽刺意味的是,领导者被合作者克服,然后他们屈服于叛逃者。但是,我们证明,新加坡模式-不仅可以通过公司生产的定期分摊收入来确定领导者的报酬,而且可以通过公司总生产的成功作为激励来决定-可以解决二阶搭便车问题。我们还表明,贿赂的有害影响始终存在,无论贿赂有多高,只要从事这项活动的个人人数比仁慈的领导者人数少,就可以制止贿赂。否则,不可避免地会突然过渡到无合作者状态。

更新日期:2020-05-22
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