Wakefield's harmful dysfunction analysis asserts that the concept of medical disorder includes a naturalistic component of dysfunction (failure of biologically designed functioning) and a value (harm) component, both of which are required for disorder attributions. Muckler and Taylor, defending a purely naturalist, value-free understanding of disorder, argue that harm is not necessary for disorder. They provide three examples of dysfunctions that, they claim, are considered disorders but are entirely harmless: mild mononucleosis, cowpox that prevents smallpox, and minor perceptual deficits. They also reject the proposal that dysfunctions need only be typically harmful to qualify as disorders. We argue that the proposed counterexamples are, in fact, considered harmful; thus, they fail to disconfirm the harm requirement: incapacity for exertion is inherently harmful, whether or not exertion occurs, cowpox is directly harmful irrespective of indirect benefits, and colorblindness and anosmia are considered harmful by those who consider them disorders. We also defend the typicality qualifier as viably addressing some apparently harmless disorders and argue that a dysfunction's harmfulness is best understood in dispositional terms.

中文翻译：

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危害是医疗障碍概念的必要组成部分：回应Muckler和Taylor。

韦克菲尔德的有害功能障碍分析断言，医学障碍的概念包括功能障碍的自然成分（生物学设计功能的失败）和价值（危害）成分，这两种疾病都是疾病归因所必需的。Muckler和Taylor捍卫了对疾病的一种纯粹的自然主义，无价值的理解，他们认为伤害对疾病不是必需的。他们提供了三个功能障碍的例子，他们声称这些功能障碍被认为是疾病，但完全无害：轻度单核细胞增多症，防止天花的牛痘和较小的知觉缺陷。他们也反对功能障碍通常只需要有害就可以被认定为疾病的提议。我们认为，提出的反例实际上被认为是有害的。因此，他们未能证实危害要求：丧失运动能力固有地是有害的，无论是否发生运动，牛痘都具有直接危害性，而无益于间接收益，并且认为色盲和失眠症的人也将其视为疾病。我们还捍卫了典型性限定词，因为它可以有效地解决一些看似无害的疾病，并认为功能障碍的危害最好从性格方面理解。