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Simultaneous inventory competition and transshipment between retailers
International Journal of Production Economics ( IF 12.0 ) Pub Date : 2020-12-01 , DOI: 10.1016/j.ijpe.2020.107781
Peng Zhang , Xiaofeng Xu , Victor Shi , Jing Zhu

Abstract In this paper, we consider a supply chain with one supplier and two competing retailers. We make a major contribution by studying simultaneous inventory competition and transshipment between the retailers. Specifically, we focus on the following research questions: how should the retailers order before demand uncertainty is realized? How should they transship between themselves after demand uncertainty is realized? How can they achieve coordination in the presence of both inventory competition and transshipment? To answer these questions, we first derive the retailers' optimal ordering quantities under both centralization and decentralization. By comparing the optimal ordering quantities under centralization and decentralization, we further derive the optimal transshipment price. We find that if the competitive intensity, represented by customer switching rate, is low, the decentralized retailers can achieve lateral coordination by setting an appropriate transshipment price. Otherwise, the decentralized retailers' optimal transshipment price equals the transshipment cost and they cannot achieve lateral coordination via transshipment. We then propose an overstock-risk and transshipment-cost sharing contract with vendor-managed inventory and prove that it can coordinate this supply chain and provide arbitrary profit allocation. To gain more managerial insights, we also conduct numerical analysis to illustrate how various parameters such as the competitive intensity, the transshipment cost, and the product's profit margin impact the inventory competition and transshipment.

中文翻译:

零售商之间同时进行库存竞争和转运

摘要 在本文中,我们考虑一个供应商和两个竞争零售商的供应链。我们通过研究零售商之间同时进行的库存竞争和转运做出了重大贡献。具体而言,我们关注以下研究问题:在需求不确定性实现之前,零售商应该如何订购?需求不确定性实现后,他们之间应该如何转运?在库存竞争和转运的情况下,它们如何实现协调?为了回答这些问题,我们首先推导出中心化和去中心化下零售商的最优订货量。通过比较中心化和去中心化下的最优订货量,进一步推导出最优转运价格。我们发现,如果竞争强度,以客户转换率低为代表,分散的零售商可以通过设置适当的转运价格来实现横向协调。否则,分散零售商的最优转运价格等于转运成本,无法通过转运实现横向协调。然后,我们提出了与供应商管理库存的积压风险和转运成本分担合同,并证明它可以协调该供应链并提供任意利润分配。为了获得更多的管理洞察力,我们还进行了数值分析,以说明竞争强度、转运成本和产品利润率等各种参数如何影响库存竞争和转运。分散的零售商可以通过设置适当的转运价格来实现横向协调。否则,分散零售商的最优转运价格等于转运成本,无法通过转运实现横向协调。然后,我们提出了与供应商管理库存的积压风险和转运成本分摊合同,并证明它可以协调该供应链并提供任意利润分配。为了获得更多的管理洞察力,我们还进行了数值分析,以说明竞争强度、转运成本和产品利润率等各种参数如何影响库存竞争和转运。分散的零售商可以通过设置适当的转运价格来实现横向协调。否则,分散零售商的最优转运价格等于转运成本,无法通过转运实现横向协调。然后,我们提出了与供应商管理库存的积压风险和转运成本分摊合同,并证明它可以协调该供应链并提供任意利润分配。为了获得更多的管理洞察力,我们还进行了数值分析,以说明竞争强度、转运成本和产品利润率等各种参数如何影响库存竞争和转运。最优转运价格等于转运成本,不能通过转运实现横向协调。然后,我们提出了与供应商管理库存的积压风险和转运成本分担合同,并证明它可以协调该供应链并提供任意利润分配。为了获得更多的管理洞察力,我们还进行了数值分析,以说明竞争强度、转运成本和产品利润率等各种参数如何影响库存竞争和转运。最优转运价格等于转运成本,不能通过转运实现横向协调。然后,我们提出了与供应商管理库存的积压风险和转运成本分摊合同,并证明它可以协调该供应链并提供任意利润分配。为了获得更多的管理洞察力,我们还进行了数值分析,以说明竞争强度、转运成本和产品利润率等各种参数如何影响库存竞争和转运。
更新日期:2020-12-01
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