We analyze symmetric subgame perfect equilibria of the dollar auction in its original format, without the modifications that the literature adopts to rule out overbidding in the game. The game has a continuum of subgame perfect equilibria, generating expected revenues that range from zero to the full value of the contested prize. Such multiplicity of equilibria suggests that the overbidding pattern often observed in experiments of this game might be symptoms of coordination failure among bidders, consistent with the rational choice paradigm with no need for behavioral or psychological explanations. The analysis is shown robust to extensions considering: (i) alternative tie-breaking rule that allows for multiple frontrunners, and (ii) preemptive bidding by the frontrunner.

我们以其原始格式来分析美元拍卖的对称子博弈完美均衡，而没有进行文献修改以排除游戏中的过高出价。该游戏具有子游戏完美平衡的连续性，产生的预期收益从零到有奖奖金的全部价值。这种均衡的多样性表明，在这个游戏的实验中经常观察到的竞价模式可能是投标人之间协调失败的症状，这与理性选择范式一致，不需要行为或心理解释。分析显示出对扩展的鲁棒性，考虑到：（i）允许多个领先者的替代平局决胜规则，以及（ii）领先者的优先竞标。