Abstract In this paper, a restricted path-based ridesharing user equilibrium (RUE) is proposed to build up the rationales between ridesharing activities and traffic congestion. In the traffic assignment problem with ridesharing, travelers simultaneously choose routes from origins to destinations and travel modes (including solo driver, ridesharing driver, and ridesharing passenger). The proposed RUE model with nonadditive path costs is more realistic than the existing ones based on some additional model specifications: ridesharing drivers bear an extra cost for taking riders and meanwhile receive an extra subsidy, and each rider is carried by only one driver. The Braess paradox is examined within the context of the proposed RUE model. The numerical results on the Braess network with and without high-occupancy toll (HOT) lane show that (a) the existence of the HOT lane will facilitate more travelers’ sharing rides, reduce the number of total vehicles (drivers), and improve the total vehicle travel time (TVTT); (b) the toll charge of solo drivers on HOT lane will promote the ridesharing activities while this effect is conditional on the levels of the extra cost and subsidy. All numerical results on the Braess network and the grid network show that more travelers will participate in ridesharing when the amount of extra subsidy for ridesharing drivers increases.

中文翻译：

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基于受限路径的拼车用户均衡

摘要 在本文中，提出了一种基于受限路径的拼车用户均衡（RUE），以建立拼车活动与交通拥堵之间的基本原理。在拼车交通分配问题中，旅行者同时选择从起点到目的地的路线和出行方式（包括单人司机、拼车司机和拼车乘客）。所提出的具有非可加路径成本的 RUE 模型比基于一些额外模型规范的现有模型更现实：拼车司机承担额外的乘客费用，同时获得额外补贴，每个乘客仅由一名司机携带。Braess 悖论在提议的 RUE 模型的背景下进行了检查。有和没有高占用收费（HOT）车道的 Braess 网络的数值结果表明（a）HOT 车道的存在将促进更多的旅客共享乘车，减少总车辆（司机）数量，并提高车辆总行驶时间（TVTT）；(b) HOT 车道独行司机的通行费将促进拼车活动，而这种影响取决于额外费用和补贴的水平。Braess 网络和网格网络上的所有数值结果都表明，当对拼车司机的额外补贴金额增加时，更多的旅行者将参与拼车。(b) HOT 车道独行司机的通行费将促进拼车活动，而这种影响取决于额外费用和补贴的水平。Braess 网络和网格网络上的所有数值结果都表明，当对拼车司机的额外补贴金额增加时，更多的旅行者将参与拼车。(b) HOT 车道独行司机的通行费将促进拼车活动，而这种影响取决于额外费用和补贴的水平。Braess 网络和网格网络上的所有数值结果都表明，当对拼车司机的额外补贴金额增加时，更多的旅行者将参与拼车。