ABSTRACT This paper presents new analytic and numerical analysis of signalling games that give rise to informational bottlenecks – that is to say, signalling games with more state/act pairs than available signals to communicate information about the world. I show via simulation that agents learning to coordinate tend to favour partitions of nature which provide maximal information transfer. This is true despite the fact that nothing from an initial analysis of the stability properties of the underlying signalling game suggests that this should be the case. As a first pass to explain this, I note that the underlying structure of our model favours maximal information transfer in regard to the simple combinatorial properties of how the agents might partition nature into kinds. However, I suggest that this does not perfectly capture the empirical results; thus, several open questions remain.

中文翻译：

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沟通瓶颈导致最大的信息传递

摘要 本文介绍了引起信息瓶颈的信号博弈的新分析和数值分析——也就是说，信号博弈具有比可用信号更多的状态/行为对来传达有关世界的信息。我通过模拟表明学习协调的代理倾向于支持提供最大信息传输的自然分区。尽管对基础信号游戏的稳定性属性的初步分析没有表明应该是这种情况，但事实确实如此。作为解释这一点的第一遍，我注意到我们模型的基础结构有利于最大信息传输，这涉及代理如何将自然划分为种类的简单组合特性。然而，我认为这并不能完美地捕捉到实证结果；因此，仍有几个悬而未决的问题。