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Limits of price competition: cost asymmetry and imperfect information
International Journal of Game Theory ( IF 0.6 ) Pub Date : 2020-04-03 , DOI: 10.1007/s00182-020-00717-1
Sneha Bakshi

In a class of asymmetric-cost duopoly price competition games, price-elastic individual demand reveals a threshold of informed buyers below which equilibrium is in monopoly prices. Even if the threshold is met, unless all buyers are informed, monopoly prices are listed and are more likely between less alike sellers. An increase in the efficient seller’s cost weakly reduces its rival’s price (in a first order stochastic dominated sense) without disturbing its profit. Lastly, increasing the number of sellers increases competitive pricing incentives.

中文翻译:

价格竞争的局限:成本不对称和不完全信息

在一类非对称成本双头垄断价格竞争博弈中,价格弹性的个人需求揭示了知情购买者的阈值,低于该阈值时,垄断价格处于均衡状态。即使达到了阈值,除非通知所有买家,否则垄断价格也会被列出,并且更有可能出现在不太相似的卖家之间。有效卖方成本的增加微弱地降低了其竞争对手的价格(在一阶随机主导的意义上),而不会影响其利润。最后,增加卖家数量会增加有竞争力的定价激励。
更新日期:2020-04-03
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