We use a first-capacity-then-price-setting game as a theoretical benchmark for an experimental study which identifies capacity precommitment, intra-play communication, and prior experience as crucial factors for collusive pricing. The theoretical model determines capacity thresholds above which firms have an incentive to coordinate on higher than equilibrium prices. The experimental data confirm that intra-play communication after capacity but before price choices fosters collusion only for capacity levels exceeding these thresholds. If communication is abandoned, prices nevertheless remain high. Asymmetry in capacities decreases the reliability of price messages as well as the probability to coordinate on equal prices.

中文翻译：

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容量预承诺、沟通和合谋定价：理论基准和实验证据

我们使用先容量然后定价的游戏作为实验研究的理论基准，该实验研究将容量预先承诺、游戏内通信和先前的经验确定为串通定价的关键因素。理论模型确定了产能阈值，高于该阈值的企业有动机协调高于均衡价格的价格。实验数据证实，容量之后但价格选择之前的游戏内通信仅在容量水平超过这些阈值的情况下促进共谋。如果放弃沟通，价格仍然很高。容量的不对称降低了价格信息的可靠性以及在同等价格上进行协调的可能性。