Core-selecting auctions were proposed as alternatives to the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) mechanism for environments with complementarities. In this paper, we consider a simple incomplete-information model that allows correlations among bidders’ values. We perform a full equilibrium analysis of three core-selecting auction formats as applied to the “local-local-global” model. We show that seller revenues and efficiency from core-selecting auctions can improve as correlations among bidders’ values increase, producing outcomes that are closer to the true core than are the VCG outcomes. Thus, there may be a theoretical justification for policymakers to utilize core-selecting auctions rather than the VCG mechanism in certain environments.

中文翻译：

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信息不完整的核心选择拍卖

核心选择拍卖被提议作为具有互补性的环境的 Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) 机制的替代方案。在本文中，我们考虑了一个简单的不完全信息模型，该模型允许投标人的价值之间存在相关性。我们对应用于“本地-本地-全球”模型的三种核心选择拍卖形式进行了全面的均衡分析。我们表明，随着投标人价值之间的相关性增加，核心选择拍卖的卖方收入和效率可以提高，从而产生比 VCG 结果更接近真实核心的结果。因此，政策制定者在某些环境中利用核心选择拍卖而不是 VCG 机制可能有理论上的理由。